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PSYCHOLOGY

news

& In Mind

THE CIA INSIDE THE MIND

How the CIA assesses weaknesses
The Gittinger personality Assessment system
by John Marks and Patricia Greenfield

At least until 1973, CIA Officials actively searched for ways to control human behavior. If somehow they could have turned people into puppets, they would have revolutionized the spy trade – or so they reasoned. CIA researchers explored even the most seemingly far-fetched corners of the behavioral sciences. In the process, they – and their military intelligence counterparts – virtualy cornered American LSD research during the 1950s, and they took such techniques as sensory deprivation and electroshock to their most gruesome extremes. Nevertheless, they never seem to have found a sure method to create a 'Manchurian Candidate', and they wound up pursuing the reduced goal of only manipulating their targets. 'You're ahead of the game if you can get people to do something 10% more often than they would do otherwise', states an ex-CIA man who worked on behavioral programs and who dismisses the possibility of total control.

In order to increase their odds, CIA operators could call on an ingenious and innovative system for assessing personality developed by one of their staff psychologists, John Gittinger. Gittinger named his method, appropriately, the Personality Assessment System (PAS). It so impressed the CIA's top leaders that they gave the Gittinger system a role in most agent-connect operations. To be sure, most Agency operators would not go nearly so far as a former Gittinger aide who says, 'The PAS was the key to the whole clandestine business.' Still, after most of the touted mind controllers had given up or been sent back home, it was Gittinger who sold his PAS to the cynical, anti-gimmick case officers in the Agency's Clandestine Services. And during the Cuban missile crisis, it was Gittinger who was summoned to the White House to advise how Krushchev would react to American pressure.

A heavy set, goateed native of Oklahoma who in his later years came to resemble actor Walter Slezak, Gittinger looked much more like someone's kindly grandfather than a calculating theoretician. He had an almost insatiable curiosity about personality, and he spent most of his waking hours tinkering with his system. So obsessed did he become that he declares he always had the feeling, even after other researchers had verified large chunks and after the CIA had put it into operational use, that the whole thing was 'a kind of paranoid delusion.'

Even before he joined the CIA in 1950, Gittinger started work on his system while serving as director of psychological services at the state hospital in Norman, Oklahoma. Numerous tramps and other itinerants, heading West, got stuck in Oklahoma during the cold months and managed to get themselves admitted to the hospital. In warmer seasons, quite a few worked as cooks or dishwashers in the short-order hamburger stands that dotted the highways in the days before fast food. They functioned perfectly well in these jobs until freezing nights drove them from their outdoor beds. Then they became 'seasonal schizophrenics'.

short order style

They also became test subjects as he measured the itinerants on the Wechsler intelligence scale, a standar-dized IQ measure composed of a variety of sub-tests. Gittinger made a chance observation that became, he says, the 'bedrock' of his whole system. He noted that the short order cooks tended to do well on digit span, the sub-test that assessed ability to recall unrelated numbers. The dishwashers, in contrast, had a poor memory for digits. Since the cooks had to keep track of complex orders - with countless variations of medium-rare and hold-to-the-mayo - their retentive quality served them well. Gittinger also noted that the cooks seemed able to maintain a high degree of efficiency in a distracting environment, as customers barked orders at them. They fell back on their internal resources and generally shut themselves of from the commotion. Gittinger dubbed this type of person, basically inwardly directed, an 'Internalizer' (abbreviated 'I'). The dishwashers, on the other hand, could not separate themselves from the external world and they had to be put off in the far reaches of the kitchen to do their jobs. Gittinger called the dishwasher type an 'Externalizer' ('E'). He found that when digit span was a strong point in *any* person – not just a cook – he could make a basic judgment about personality. An important aspect of this judgment is that it is relative: how good is a person's memory for digits relative to the same person's general level of intellectual ability?

From observation, Gittinger concluded babies were born with distinct personalities, which then were modified by environment. The internalized, or I, baby is caught up in himself and tends to come across as a passive child; hence, the world usually calls him a 'good baby.' The E child is more interested in outside stimuli, and thus is more likely to cause problems by demanding attention. Gittinger believed that the way parents and other authority figures react to the child helps to modify this *primitive* (or inborn) *level* of the trait. Adults often pressure the I child to be more outgoing and the E one to become more self-sufficient. Gittinger found he could measure the resulting compensation or adjustment with another Wechsler sub-test, arithmetic. This compensation (or its absence) creates the next level of personality called the *basic level*, reflecting childhood learning incorporated into everyday functioning. Even after childhood, environment can modify a person's I or E qualities, and this last modification, creating the *surface* or *contact level* can be measured by the Wechsler information subtest.

Gittinger noted that when a person is subject to stress, these compensations and modifications tend to disappear, as the person reverts to his or her original personality type. He wrote that his system 'makes possible the assessment of fundamental discrepancies between the surface personality and the underlying personality structure - discrepancies that produce tension, conflict, and anxiety.' But compensation and modification are also considered normal growth processes that allow the developing person to cope with a changing world. An interesting consequence of this 'layered' view of personality is that it can be used to distinguish 'look-alikes'- people who show similar behavior arrived at from very different underlying personality dynamics. Thus, both the compensated Externalizer and the uncompensated Internalizer would look like classic introverts at their basic level of functioning. The compensated E person would, however, tend to be more determined or tense, even punishing of E behavior in other people.

Besides the I and E dimension, Gittinger identified two other basic sets of personality characterstics, measurable on still other Wechsler sub-tests. From the block-design sub-test, he assesses if the person is *Regulated* (R) or *Flexible* (F). The *Regulated* person does well on block design, learns easily by rote, and does not need to understand to learn. The *Flexible* one, on the other hand, does relatively poorly on block design and has to understand before learning. Gittinger noted R children seem to pick up relatively competent piano playing rather easily whild an F child usually hates the drudgery of lessons. Yet, Gittinger observed the great concert pianists tend to be Fs who had stuck it out and mastered the instrument.

Other psychologists have noted personality dimensions similar to Gittinger's E-I and R-F, even if they labeled them somewhat differently. His most original dimension is the third aspect of personality, social responsiveness and adaptability. He measures this dimension with the Wechsler picture arrangement sub-test and calls it the *Role Adaptive* (A) vs. *Role Uniform* (U) dimension. A relatively high score on picture arrangement indicates a primitive level A personality. This dimension corresponds to the person's 'charisma', since others are naturally attracted to the A person while they tend to ignore the U. As with other dimensions, he assesses compensations with other sub-tests. Relative strength or weakness on each sub-test is assessed against a weighted average of all the tests; this weighted score roughly corresponds to IQ.

unique system

Gittinger's system is thus unique in addressing the problem of the development of personality and in claiming to measure personality traints as they existed at different times in a person's life. But what is the evidence that this is really so? One Gittinger associate, Dr. David R. Saunders, now with the Princeton consulting firm, Mathtech, used various methods to investigate this point and came up with mixed results. On the positive side, Saunders found the scatter of digit span, block design, and picture arrangement scores on about 12,000 Wechslers showed the normal distribution expected of complex inherited traits. This was in line with the claim these sub-tests measure the primitive, or inborn level of personality. And the scores on six other sub-tests which are used to assess the basic and contact levels indeed do manifest skewed distributions, indicating patterns of environmentally induced under- or overachievement relative to a person's genetic potential.

But other lines of evidence are not so clearcut. Both Saunders and John Winne, a psychologist who worked with Gittinger inside the CIA, have looked at the stability of sub-test scores over time, reasoning that those measuring genetic endowment should be more stable than the ones reflecting environmental factors. In both children and adults, the digit span and block design tests prove relatively stable but the picture arrangement score does not. Picture arrangement assesses the A-U dimension, and, in fact, other studies indicate this dimension is less adequately measured than the other two.

Three levels of three binary traints yield complex personality structure and 512 personality types. (There are actually 1024 because each type can be moderated by high or low activity level, as assessed by the digit symbol sub-test of the Wechsler.) Dr. Richard York, a colleague of Gittinger in the development of the PAS and now at the Cape Cod Mental Health Centre, Hyannis, Massachusetts, says, 'It's like real life; it better be pretty complex.' This complexity alone worked against its acceptance by the outside world, as did the fact that Gittinger based much of it on ideas that ran contrary to accepted psychological doctrine - such as the unpopular notion that genetic differences existed. Other barriers to acceptance included the idea that personality is a function of ability and the warning put forth by David Wechsler himself that sub-test profiles are unreliable. A major reason for this warning is the earlier result of a statistical technique called factor analysis showing that the Wechsler battery measures no more than five discrete, independent abilities, not the ten required by the PAS system. Saunders and Gittinger countered this argument, pointing out that this result is an artificial limit of the way the analysis was done. When Saunders removed this limitation by doing a new analysis of the Wechsler in which every item of every sub-test was entered as a separate variable, 18 distinguishable ability factors emerged, more than enough for a PAS assessment.

"I Spy with my little eye"

Cooking Up Spies

That Gittinger was not a Ph. D. (he never finished his thesis at NYU) whose theory sprang from the kitchen habits of bums in Oklahoma did not help the scientific respectability of the system. Any one of these drawbacks might have stifled Gittinger in the academic world, but to the CIA's pragmatists, they were irrelevant. Gittinger's strange ideas seemed to work. With uncanny accuracy, he could look at nothing more than a person's Wechsler numbers, pinpoint the person's weaknesses, and show how to make him into a spy. Once high CIA officials realized the covert applications, they gave Gittinger the time and money to improve his system, first under the auspices of an Agency front foundation, the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology (also called the Human Ecology Fund) and, after 1962, under the cover of CIA-controlled, Washington-based firm called Psychological Assessment Associates. Gittinger's staff grew to about 15 professionals (including a hand-writing expert) who serviced CIA operations around the world.

national stereotypes

Gittinger also directed the flow of CIA funds to outside researchers to verify and expand the PAS. For example, according to records of the Human Ecology Fund, Educational Testing Service received about £140,000 for a project carried out by David Saunders. Among other things, Saunders found a correlation between brain (EEG) patterns and digit span results; he also developed a computerized method for mathematically defining similar PAS profiles and helped Gittinger apply the system to other countries. In this regard, Gittinger understood that the Wechsler battery had a cultural bias and that a Japanese E had quite a different personality than, say, a Russion E. To compensate, he and his colleagues worked out localized versions of the PAS.

Out of their work to use the PAS cross-culturally came the identification of national cultural stereotypes. Gittinger pegged the Chinese as an IRU culture, the Soviet Union as ERU, the United States as ERA, and so on. Gittinger states that societal pressure tends to push people towards conforming with these norms. According to this conception, the cultural stereotype should be the most prevalent personality type at the surface level, and it should appear more frequently there than at birth. The test scores of about 25,000 Americans confirm these predictions.

A charming and persuasive man, Gittinger was skilled at not threatening the egos of his co-workers and the outside researchers, as he carefully taught them his system. Those who worked with him describe him in terms that range from great respect to pure idolatry. Those interviewed all state they were never able to use his PAS as skillfully as he did. Not that he did not try to teach them, but he simply was a more talented natural assessor than any of the others. Moreover, the system was full of interrelations and contextual variables that he instinctively understood but did not articulate. Even after CIA officials spent a small fortune trying to computerize the PAS, they found the machine could take raw scores and give formulas but could not write reports on individuals in any useful way.

Some CIA-funded researchers, like the late psychiatrist Robert Hyde, were so impressed with Gittinger's system that they made it a major part of their own work. Working during the 1950s at Massachusetts Mental Health Center and then Butler Health Center in Providence, Hyde routinely gave Wechslers to his subjects before testing LSD or alcohol on them. At Butler, Hyde used CIA money to build an experimental party room, complete with pin-ball machine, dart board, and a two-way mirror from behind which subjects could be observed while getting high. Not surprisingly, the observers found that pure Internalizers became more withdrawn after several drinks, and that uncompensated Es were likely to become more garrulous - in essence, sloppy drunks. From this research, Gittinger was able to make generalizations about the different way an I or an E reacted to alcohol. Then, once he had a person's score on a couple of Wechsler sub-tests, he could predict how he or she would react to liquor. He and Dr. Harold Abramson, working with CIA funds at New Yorkss Mr. Sinai Hospital, made the same kind of observation for LSD, finding, among other things, that an E was more likely than an I to have a bad trip. (Apparently, I's are more accustomed than E's to 'being into their own heads' and losing touch with external reality.)

At Gittinger's urging, other CIA grantees gave Wechslers to their test subjects and sent him the scores. He needed samples of all types of behavior and personality to build up his unique data base. By getting the scores of actors, he could generalize on who made good role players. Martin Orne an Harvard, who was receiving Agency funds, sent in the scores of his hypnosis subjects, so Gittinger could distinguish the personality patterns of those who easily went into a trance from those who could bot be hypnotized. Gittinger collected the Wechslers of businessmen, students, fashion models, doctors, and just about any other distinct group he could arrange to have tested. In huge numbers, the Wechslers flowed in - 29,000 sets by the early 1970s, each one accompanied by biographical data, anonymously presented. With 10 PAS-relevant sub-tests and at least 10 possible scores on each of those, no two Wechsler profiles ever looked exactly the same. Gittinger kept a computer printout of 29,000 on his desk, and he fiddled with them constantly - always looking for new truths.

deviant forms

John Gitinger was interested in all facets of personality, but because he worked for the CIA, he emphasixed deviant forms. He particularly sought out Wechslers of people who had rejected society's values or who had some vice - hidden or otherwise - that caused others to reject them. By studying the scores of foreigners who had defected to the United States, Gittinger hoped to identify the common characteristics of people who had become traitors to their home governments. Dr. Harris Isbell, who ran the CIA-funding drug testing program at the Lexington, Kentucky Public Health Service hospital, sent in the scores of heroin addicts. Gittinger could then identify what to look for in people susceptible to drugs. Agency research at the Ionia State Hospital in Michigan furnished Wechslers of sexual psychopaths. These scores showed that people with uncontrollable urges have different personality patterns than so-called normals. Gittinger personally tested homosexuals, lesbians, and prostitutes, looking for telltale signs of sexual preference. Gittinger believed he could match the Wechsler profile of a new subject to that of people in the data base with known behavior patterns, and use these as a basis for predicting future behavior of the subject.

This potentially practical assessment procedure was made possible by a validation technique known as 'reference grouping', developed by Saunders. Saunders' reference groups are sets of individuals who are similar to each other in both behavior and Wechsler profile. A computer performed an objective statistical evaluation of profile similarity, but determing behavioral similarity was a more subjective process. As of August, 1973, 57 reference groups had been identified from the Wechsler data bank. It was not uncomon for 30 to 60% of the people with a given profile to manifest the defining behavior, despite the fact that the amount of behavioral information accompanying each Wechsler profile in the data bank varied tremendously from case to case. Indeed, there was one reference group for which every female with a given profile also manifested the defining pattern of behavior.

Some of the most promising applications of the reference group technique are in vocational guidance. Dorothy Martin, a student of Saunders' at the University of Colorado, showed that, among the sample of women in the real estate business, sales people who constantly had to adapt to new customers tended to be A's while those who managed offices and thus dealt with the same staff usually were U's. This kind of information could be used to help people make satisfying career choices which make use of their strengths. Martin's findings seem to confirm, with respect to job choice, a prime tenet of the PAS as expressed by Saunders and Gittinger, 'that most individual behavior may be regarded as helping to minimize for the individual the significance of his weaknesses.'Comparing the PAS with MMPI, a leading personality inventory, PAS researacher, Dr. Charles K. Krauskopf of the University of Missouri, says that the MMPI can also be used to form tight reference groups. However, he prefers the Wechsler-based PAS assessment for two reasons: (1) it is based on a reasonably cohherent theoretical rationale; and (2) it differentiates normal personality types better than the pathology-based MMPI.

The PAS obviously works best when a complete set of Wechsler scores is available. As a practical matter, however, CIA officials could not ask a Russian diplomat or most other targets to sit down and be tested. Gittinger understood this and worked out a system of 'indirect assessment'. He or other CIA men observed their target's behavior from afar, studied all intelligence available on him, and picked out patterns that corresponded to profiles already recorded among the 29,00 Wechsler subjects. CIA psychologists and psychiatrists have long used the PAS indirectly to write up personality profiles of world leaders like the Shah of Iran who they pegged as a brilliant but dangerous megalomaniac.

For example, Gittinger had a good idea how each personality type reacted to a few drinks. Thus, if the target behaved in a recognizable way at a cocktail party - by withdrawing - he could make an educated guess about his personality type -that the target was an I. In comparison, the drunken Russian who pinched every woman who passed was probably an E. Instead of using the test scores to predict behavior, Gittinger was , in effect, looking at behavior and working backwards to predict how the target would have scored if he had taken the test. Gittinger and his staff developed a whole checklist of 30 to 40 characteristics that the skilled observer could look for and which corresponded to some insight picked up from the 29,000 profiles in the data|base.

Was the target sloppy or neat/ Did he relate to women stiffly or easily/ When he went trough a receiving line, did he immediately repeat the name of each person introduced to him/ Taken as a whole, the answers to these questions allowed Gittinger to make a reasoned estimate about the target's personality, with emphasis on vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the CIAS psychologist had his doubts about indirect assessment. 'I never thought we were good at this', he says.
To be continued next month

JADUNATH

I.Q. Again

Chris Brand has been one of the staunchest supporters of the view that variations in intelligence can be equated with differences in mental speed, trying along with many other researchers, to link various measures of intelligence with inspection time, IT. The subject's tasks is to judge which of a pair of straight lines is longer. The lines are presented briefly in a tachistoscope and are followed immediately by a masking stimulus. IT is defined as the minimum exposure duration at which a subject can maintain a given level of accuracy. While the simplicity of the task is a strength, it can have other weaknesses such as a subject getting fifty per cent of responses correct by guessing. The methodlogy tries to overcome this problem, by taking IT to be the shortest duration at which nine out of ten judgments were correct, but there seems to be so little understanding of the process underlying inspection time that such methodlogical frills would be of a statistical nature only. One fairly robust finding so far about the relationship between IT and intelligence is that it tends to be strong in mentally retarded subjects. For normal subjects, the results are equivocal.

Charles Hulme and dnnifer Turnbull performed yet another replication using 65 six and seven year old 'normal' children and eight mentally retarded adults, aged 22 to 44. The sample came from a village school and the pupils' eyesight was good. A short form of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children was used to assess overall intelligence scores.|Performance IQ was measured with the Block Design and Object Assembly sub sclaes; verbal IQ was assessed by using the Vocabulary and Similarities subscales.

The overall IQ scores ranged from 89 to 150, verbal IQ ranged from 75 to 152 and performance IQ ranged from 86 to 155. IT scores spanned from 70 to 175 milliseconds.

The overall IQ scores did not correlate significantly with IT scores (-0.20) and nor did verbal IQ , -0.08. There was a small but significant correlation at the 0.05 level in the predicted direction between performance I.Q and Inspection Time, -0.29 Hulme and Turnbull thought that the Inspection Time scores had a restricted range so they did separate analyses using two extreme groups drawn from their sample. Yet again, the relationship between full I.Q and inspection time was not statistically significant.

When Hulme and Turnbull tested their eight mentally retarded subjects, they only assessed peformance IQ. This may have been an unfortunate omission though they say the reason was that their "prime aim" was to replicate the findings of Lally and Nettelbeck. For the record, they found a large correlation between performance IQ and inspection time, -0.071 at the 0.05 level. Notice how both large samples and small correlations and small samples and large correlations can produce the same statistical significance level.

Is inspection time an analytic or global skill. Hulme and Turnbull say that "theoretically" one might expect a stronger relationship between IT and performance I.Q. since both involve visual processing. But, practically rather than theoretically, there is a difference. Performance IQ, using 'object

assembly', for example, involves the subject actively manipulating objects and comparing the stimuli whereas in a tachistoscope, judgements are always "at a distance". Visual processing can require either wholistic or analytic techniques. To identify the number of letters b in the series bbaclddbdda would take longer than to identify the word 'sequential' even though that has the same number of letters since the word need not be analysed letter by letter.

The nature of the stimuli seems to make a difference too. Hartnoll (1978) found no relationship for identifying drawings of animals though there was one when names of beasts had to be recognised. Brand, the prophet of IT, admitted in 1982 that.."..spatial abilities may require their own unique story - whether or not they involve some other kind of mental speed." Also confusing is the comparison of mentally retarded people with normal adults or children. Mentall retarded is a label which can cover all degrees of handicap and, all too often, researchers do not specify - or it may not be known - what the cause or extent of the handicap. Hulme and Turnbull reason that the 'approximate mental ages" give means of 7.73 years for the normals and 10.24 for the mentally retarded. "Thus, the inferior performance of the mentally retarded is all the more striking given that their mental ages are actually higher than those of the normal children." This may not be all that more striking. The mentally retarded adults may, with a mean of 10.24, have reached their peak intellect; one would not expect their I.Q. to improve with chronological age. But one would expect a sample of normal children to get better with age and to see their mental age increase. It would be very surprising if these village school children, or any others, did not improve on inspection time or learn to learn. If this is the case, then the important question is now generalisable is this "learning to learn" across tasks and situations. The answer, on present evidence, is 'not much'.

WEhile recognising the probable organic origin of mentally retarded people's problems, there is still the additional factor of differential reinforcement. If individuals go through life getting most things wrong, and being told it, they have little motivation to try new things. Expecting failure, they may not take the risk of making reasonable guesses that more confident people make. Till the personality of mentally retarded people is researched more, it will remain one of the very many factors confounding interpretation of the relationship between inspection time and I.Q.

Brand, C and Deary, I.JIntelligence and Inspection Time in H.J.Eysenck, ed, Models for Intelligence, Springer, 1982

Hartnoll S, 1978, Verbal and spatial ability and their relation to inspection time for word picture stimuli. Final honours thesis, university of Dublin.

Hulme C and Turnbull J,1983, Intelligence and Inspection time in normal and mentally retarded subjects. British Journal of Psychology, 74, 365-70.

Dr. Richard York, now of the Cape Cod Mental Health Centre, has tested the validity of using informally observed behavior to predict a person's PAS formula. Attempting to predict where 10 individuals would stand on independently obtained Wechsler scores for the primitive and basic level of each dimension, York made hits on 45 out of 60 — a statistically reliable beating of chance. Saunders is currently working on a CIA project to computerize this transformation from behavioral data to personality formulation. Saunders' computer program will be able to take in behavioral information and give out personality descriptions in plain language. The computer will use the Personality Assessment System as its program to make this transformation, bypassing test scores altogether. If such a program can yield valid personality descriptions at the present time then indirect assessment, using behavioral cues from everyday life, must have advanced considrably since Gittinger's retirement.

Whether used directly or indirectly, the PAS gave Agency case officers a tool to get better reading of the people with whom they dealt. CIA stations overseas routinely sent all their findings on a target along with indirect checklists, back to Washington, so headquarters personnel could decide whether to try to recruit the person as a spy. The Gittinger assessment staff tried to predict what ploys would work best on the target. "Our job was to recommend what strategy to try," says a one-time Gittinger colleague. This source states he had direct knowledge of cases where recommendations led to sexual entrapment operations, both hetero- and homosexual. "We had women ready — called them a stable," he notes, and they found willing men when they had to.

"I've heard John (Gittinger) say there's always something that someone wants," says another ex-CIA psychologist. "And with the PAS you can find out what it is. It's not necessarily sex or booze. Sometimes, it's status or recognition or security." A third Gittinger colleague describes this process as "looking for soft spots." He states that after years of working with the PAS, he still bridled at a few of the more fiendish ways "to get at people" that his co-workers dreamed up. He stayed on until retirement, however, and he adds, "None of this was personal. It was for national security reasons."

A few years ago, ex-CIA psychologist James Keehner told reporter Maureen Orth that he personally went to New York in 1969 to give Wechsler tests to an American nurse who had volunteered her body for her country. "We wanted her to sleep with this Russian," explained Keehner. "Either the Russian would fall in love with her and defect or we'd blackmail him. I had to see if she could sleep with him over a period of time and not get involved emotionally. Boy, was she tough!" Keehner noted that he became disgusted with entrapment techniques and, more generally, the picking-at-scabs aspect of CIA assessment work. Once the PAS had identified a target as having potential mental instabilities, staff members sometimes suggfested ways to break him down, reasoning that by using a ratchet-like approach of putting him under increased pressure, they might be able to break the lines that tied him to his country, if not to his sanity. Keehner stated, "I was sent to deal with the most negative aspects of the human condition. It was

THE CIA INSIDE THE MIND

PSYCHOLOGISTS AND THE MEDIA

The Northern Branch of the B.PS is holding a one day conference/workshop on the relations between psychologists and the media.

Our prime concern is with how northern psychologists can better use the media as channels for the communication of psychological expertise, psychological knowledge and the psychological approach to relevant social issues.

To this end we have invited local media people to talk about their involvement with psychologists in a news and features context, and national media people to discuss the image of psychology and psychologists in the more informed quality press.

The workshop component is a session with Dr.John Nicholson, a psychologist with much experience of making psychology accessible through his broadcasting and television work. He will lead a session devoted to practical aspects of communication; news releases, interviews and requests for psychological comment on topical questions.

The date of the workshop is March 26th and the venue is at the University of Manchester. Further details from Dr. Charles Antaki at the Psychology Department, University of Lancaster.

planned destructiveness. First, you'd check to see if you could destroy a man's marriage. If you could, then that would be enough to put a lot of stresses on the individual, to break him down. Then you might start a minor rumor campaign against him. Harrass him constantly. Bump his car in traffic. A lot of it is ridiculous, but it may have a cumulative effect."

Most operations, however, including most recruitments, tried to minimize the stress rather than to accentuate it. CIA operators tended to agree that the best way to recruit an agent was to make the relationship as productive and satisfying as possible for him. Operating from the old adage about catching more flies with honey than vinegar. "You pick the thing most fearful to him — the things which would cause him the most doubt, then go the opposite way." says an ex-Agency psychologist. "If his greatest fear is he can't trust you to protect him and his family, you overload your pitch with your ability to do it."

Soon after the successful recruitment of a foreigner to spy for the CIA, either an Agency psychologist or specially trained case officer sat down with the new agent to give him the full battery of Weschlers. The tester never mentioned that the exercise had anything to do with personality but called it an "aptitude" test — which it also is. The results were then analyzed back in Washington.

Most case officers prided themselves on their ability to play their agents like a musical instrument, at just the right tempo. The PAS did not shake their belief that nothing could beat their own intuition. Former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline expresses a common view when he says the PAS "was part of the system — kind of a check and balance — a supposedly scientific tool that was not weighted very heavily. I never put as much weight on the psychological assessment reports as on a case officer's view... In the end people went with their own opinion."

Gittinger feels that the greatest value of his system to case officers was that it gave them a way of comunicating about their failures, rather than because it ensured success in handling agents. According to PAS researcher, Krauskopf, the CIA used lots of

different assessment systems but the Personality Assessment System became influential in the Agency because people experienced it as more useful. The personal impact of the system was dramatized for the authors when, interviewing some PAS researchers at home, we found that their wives and children had adopted the PAS terminology over the years to talk about significant people in their lives. Indeed, this happened to us in the course of researching this article.

Former CIA Director William Colby, while careful not to overemphasize the Agency's reliance on the PAS, states the system made dealing with agents "more systematized, more professional." Test results could be used to select the right person for a particular spy mission. Gittinger tells an illustrative anecdote:

In an intelligence context, two people were asked to go next door to describe something there. It happened a fire broke out. Each returned independently to report. I had test scores on these two people; one was an Externalizer, the other an Internalizer. The E came in and said, "I couldn't see a damn thing because there was a fire next door." The I, in contrast, came in with complete details of what he was supposed to report. Then he was asked about the fire. His reply: "What fire?"

This incident illustrates that an E agent is good for the kind of intelligence gathering that involves keeping eyes and ears open to everything around him, while an I does better when giving a specific thing to look for.

In 1963, the CIA's Inspector general gave the Gittinger assessment staff high marks and described how it fits into operations: "The (CIA) case officer is first and foremost, perhaps, a practitioner of the art of assessing and exploiting human personality and motivations for ulterior purposes. The ingredients of advanced skill in this art are highly individualistic in nature, including such qualities as perceptiveness and imagination. (The PAS) seeks to enhance the case officer's skill by bringing the methods and disciplines of psychology to bear. . . The prime objectives are control, exploitation, or neutralization. These objectives are innately anti-ethical rather than therapeutic in their intent."

With the PAS, CIA officials had a handy tool for social engineering. The Gittinger staff found one use for it in the sensitive area of selecting members of foreign police and intelligence agencies. All over the globe, CIA operators have frequently maintained intimate working relations with security services that brutally mistreat their own citizens. On at least two occasions, Agency psychologists have used the PAS to help choose members of secret poslice whose human rights are among the world's worst.

In 1961, ex-Agency psychologist John Winne recalls he went of to Korea to "select the initial cadre" of the Korean CIA which its American counterpart was then playing a key role in setting up. He gave a Korean version of the Weschler to 25 to 30 Korean candidates and wrote up a half-page report on each, listing strengths and weaknesses. The results went to the Korean authorities, whom Winne believes made the personnel decisions "in conjunction with our operational people."

"We would do a job like this and never get feedback," Winne complains, "so we were never sure we'd done a good job." Sixteen years after his mission to Seoul and after news of KCIA repression at home and bribes for US congressmen abroad, Winne feels that his best efforts had "boomeranged."

In 1966, CIA staffers, including Gittinger himself, took part in selecting members of an equally controversial police unit in Uraguay — the anti-terrorist section that fought the Tupamaro urban guerrillas. The CIA-assisted police claimed they were in a life and death struggle against the guerrillas and they used heavy-handed methods, including torture, to stamp out most of the Uraguayan left along with the guerrillas.

While the special police were being organized, "John (Gittinger) came down for three days to get the program underway," recalls John Cassidy the number two CIA man in Uruguay at the time. Then, a Gittinger associate, Hans Greiner, ran Weschlers on 20 Uruguayan candidates. One question on the information sub-test was: How many weeks in the year? Eighteen of the 20 said, "48," and only one person got the answer right. But when Greiner asked this same group, "Who wrote *Faust?*" 18 of 20 knew it was Goethe. "This test tells you something about the culture," notes Cassidy who served all over Latin America for the Agency. It also points up the difficulty Gittinger had in making the PAS work across cultural lines.

In any case, the CIA's Cassidy found the process most useful for showing how to train the anti-terrorist section. "According to the results, these men were shown to have very dependent psychologies and they needed strong direction," he recalls. "For years I had been dealing with Latin Americans, and here, largely by psychological tests, one of (Gittinger's) men was able to analyze people he had no experience with and give me some insight into them. . . Ordinarily, we would have just selected the men and gone to work on them."

In helping countries like South Korea and Uruguay pick their secret police, CIA psychologists often inserted a devilish twist with the PAS. They not only chose candidates who would make good investigators, interrogators, or whatever, but they also identified those most likely to succumb to future CIA blandishments. "Certain types were more recruitable," notes an ex-assessment officer. "I looked for them when I wrote my reports. . . Anytime the Company (the CIA) spent money for training a foreigner, the object was that he would ultimately serve our control purposes."

In 1973, Gittinger and his longtime associate John Winne published a basic description of the PAS as a monograph to the *Journal of Clinical Psychology*. Soon thereafter, Gittinger, then 56 stopped being head of the CIA assessment staff but stayed on as a consultant. In 1974 one of the authors of this article (Marks) wrote about Gittinger's work, albeit incompletely, in *Rolling Stone* magazine. Gittinger was disturbed that disclosure of his CIA connection would hurt his professional reputation. "Are we tarred by a brush because we worked for the CIA?" he asked during one of several rather emotional exchanges. "I'm proud of it." He saw no ethical problems in "looking for people's weaknesses" if it helped the CIA obtain information, and he declared that for many years most

Americans thought this was a useful process. At first, he offered to give Marks the Weschler tests and prepare a personality assessment to explain the system, but the CIA officials forbade him from doing so. "I was given no explanation," said the obviously disappointed Gittinger. "I'm very proud of my professional work and I had looked forward to being able to explain it."

The opportunity to be personally assessed did fall to the other author (Greenfield) when she was invited to a 1978 PAS workshop organized by counselling psychologist Charles Krauskopf at the University of Missourie. She writes:

I asked Krauskopf to predict my profile in advance. On the basis of a day's acquaintance with me and a few previous phone conversations, he was able to do no better than chance. Gittinger, whom I had interviewed months before, turned out to have been wrong as well. As in the case of my own prediction about myself, he mistook my basic level, IFU, for my primitive, which was EFA. The E and the A both surprised me. Yet each surprise gave me useful insight into my own personality. The E explained why, for example, the vibrations from a large group of students can distract me so much when I lecture and why I rely on notes. The A made me realize that my insecurity about social acceptablilty is based on later conditioning and is not a fundamental trait. The latter understanding made me feel freer about the social side of my being, the former, more accepting of my compelling need for notes, even when I am speaking about a subject I know very well.

My own prediction about my Weschler results indicated that I was unaware of my primitive level trait on the two dimensions (I-E and A-U) where the test showed my primitive level trait had been reversed by basic level compensation. On the other hand, my prediction was correct on the one dimension (R-F) where no basic level compensation had occured.

Indeed, these predictive errors relate closely to the results of a study by Thetford and Schucman, PAS researchers from Columbia University. They found that, overall, people prefer a person described in terms of their own basic level characteristics, especially when the basic level trait is a reversal of the primitive level counterpart. It is almost as if an overcompensation reaction has taken place, causing the person to reject a trait found unacceptable in oneself.

In August, 1977, Gittinger publicly testified in Senate hearings. While he obviously would have preferred talking about his psychological research, his most persistent questioner, Senator Edward Kennedy, was much more interested in bringing out sensational details about CIA studies of prostitutes and LSD. A proud man, Gittinger felt "humiliated" by the experience, which ended with him looking foolish on national television. The next month, the testimony of his former associate, David Rhodes, further bruised Gittinger. Rhodes told the senators about Gittinger's role in leading the "gang that couldn't spray straight"

in an abortive attempt to test LSD out of an aerosol can on unwitting party guests. Gittinger does not want his place in history to be determined by this kind of activity. He would like to see his Personality Assessment System accepted as an important contribution to science.

Indeed, Gittinger's Personality Assessment System received recognition in the fifth (1972) edition of Weschler's Measurement and Appraisal of Intelligence by Joseph Matarazzo. Matarazzo devotes 14 pages to the system and says that he contributed Weschler scores to the data bank on which the PAS was based. According to John Winne, Matarazzo worked on the system itself, under contract to Psychological Assessment Associates. While Matarazzo states that most of the work done using the PAS is unpublished and virtually unknown in the field, he does not mention its CIA history. In terms of PAS theory Matarazzo points to the developmental studies by Bayley and Honzik which show behavioral and personality correlates to Weschler sub-tests and therefore tend to confirm the validity of Gittinger's approach. Matarazzo's 1972 book presented Gittinger's system as a comprehensive theory which yields testable hypotheses about personality. Yet informal contact with a number of clinical and personality psychologists indicates that it is still virtually unknown.

Tired of the controversy and worn down by trying to explain the PAS, Gittinger has moved back to his native Oklahoma. He took a copy of the 29,000 Weschler scores with him, but he has lost his ardor for working with them. A handful of psychologists around the country still swear by the system and try to pass it on to others. Krauskopf teaches the Personality Assessment System to graduate students at the University of Missouri, while York and colleague, Robert MacLaughlin, give a PAS workshop every summer at American International College. One psychologist who uses it in private practice, says that in therapy it saves six months in understanding the patient. This psychologist takes a full reading of his patient's personality with the PAS, and then he varies the treatment to fit the person's particular problems. He believes that most American psychologists and psychiatrists treat their patients the same, whereas the PAS is designed to identify the differences between people. Gittinger very much hopes that other professionals will accept this view and move his system into the mainstream. "It means nothing unless I can get someone else to work on it," he states.

Given the inevitable taint arising from the CIA's role in developing the system and Gittinger's lack of energy and academic credentials, his wish may never be fulfilled. Yet, he can take heart by the fact that some of the conceptual biases in the academic community have been changing. The increasingly cognitive emphasis within American psychology may make clinical psychologists more receptive to the notion that personality is a function of cognitive abilities. Indeed, leading personality psychologist Walter Mischel pointed out in his 1968 book, *Personality and Assessment*, that ability measures have more generality and stability than traditional personality measures. It follows from this that an ability-based personality measure could have advantages over the more traditional projective tests and personality inventories in predicting behavior. Moreover, Mischel has criticized the tendency of personality theories to categorize people into a very few slots. Gittinger's Personality Assessment System, with its 1024 basic slots, seems to be the only personality theory in existence which does not attempt to reduce a seemingly infinite range of personalities to but a few types. Yet at the same time, the PAS is theoretically parsimonious. Because of the unique way it combines variables, all 1024 types are generated by only three basic personality dimensions, plus the moderator variable of activity level. In this way, the system is cognitively manageable, an important practical requirement if it is to be usable by human beings with their limited information processing capacities.

Even Gittinger's premise that people are born with different personalities has begun to achieve scientific respectability, as the work of T. Berry Brazelton and Thomas, Birch and Chess indicates. Clearly, the PAS is very much in tune with these recent developments. In addition to recognizing inborn characteristics, the field of developmental psychology currently views development as a transactional process involving successive interactions between the child and his or her environment. This concept is intrinsic to the Personality Assessment System, which attempts to measure not only inborn personality but also the results of environmental modification at two later points in time. Gittinger's Personality Assessment System is thus the only personality theory which has a transactional concept of development built into its assessment techniques.

Finally, there has been controversy in the field of personality about whether behavior is consistent, reflecting underlying personality dispositions, or simply varies depending on the particular situation. The PAS provides a way of resolving the personality-situation conflict by identifying different levels of personality which may be in conflict ~~by identifying different levels of personality which may be in conflict~~. Thus, it says that some people are more internally consistent than others and that these people will act more consistently across a range of situations. If a person has opposing traits at different levels, this person may act in opposite ways at different times. What layer a person will show in what situation will depend on factors like how much stress the person is under whether the person is consciously aware of the behavior. Indeed, after reading a preprint of this article, Daryl Bern, a personality researcher who has been concerned with resolving the trait-situation controversy in personality theory, became interested in doing further research on the PAS.

Assessment is always a double-edged sword. It can be used to reduce people to categories, to place them in institutional pigeonholes, to take advantage of their weaknesses. On the other hand, it can help people find satisfying work or give them insights into their strengths and weaknesses at levels below conscious awareness. The potential power and precision of the Personality Assessment System makes it as dangerous as it could be useful. If this article stimulates further interest on the part of the psychological community or the general public, we must take care to prevent the use of Gittinger's Personality Assessment System as an instrument of manipulation while promoting its application as a tool of progressive social change and personal growth.

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