Toward an Operational and Logical Analysis of Intentionality: The Use of Discourse in Early Child Language

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The more deeply I have gone into the psychology of language, the more impressed I have become with the absence in psychology of certain forms of psychological analysis that are needed in the study of language acquisition and language use generally. One such is the role of intention and the perception of intention in others. Language use is premised in a massive way upon presuppositions about intentions and about the reasons why people do or say things. Yet psychology, or at least positivist "causal" psychology, ignores the role of intention and assigns no interpretation to reasons in the regulation of behavior. Such matters are most often treated as epiphenomena.

—J. S. Bruner

This chapter is about the possibility of operationalizing intention through the analysis of conversational discourse and, more generally, the sequential aspect of interaction behavior. My attempt to realize this possibility is based upon the belief that the logic of teleological analysis has been a

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major barrier causing intention to be ignored in psychology preventing its integration of intention into the causal paradigm of experimental psychology; and 2. that the analysis of short, discrete units in isolation (utterances or sentences, in the area of language and language acquisition) rather than more extended streams of behavior has, up to now, prevented the problem of operational definition from being approached in a systematic fashion.

Margaret Boden, a philosopher-psychologist, points out the essential connection between these two points in her book, Purposive Explanation in Psychology (1972). "The first logical criterion of teleological explanation is the necessity of prospective reference. In 'formally mechanistic' contexts by definition, no reference to the future need be made in explaining the occurrence of a present phenomenon" (p. 40).

This logic of prospective reference means that current behavior can be understood only in relation to its future course, and this implies the necessity for studying extended behavioral sequences, rather than the discrete behavioral "atoms" required by positivist "causal" theories. Thus, "purposive" explanation is not "atomistic." Atomistic explanations connect independently identifiable units, future units may be predictable from the prior occurrence of other units, granted certain general postulates of correlation. But the future units need not be appealed to in any way for the initial occurrence of the prior units and thus are logically isolable from them (Boden, 1972, p. 41).

Teleological analysis was out during the reign of behaviorism. For example, in the operant paradigm, the reinforcer follows a response. The reinforcer was not considered to be a goal which "causes" behavior; rather behavior produces the reinforcer (Greenfield, 1971). How could something that occurred later (the goal) cause something prior (the means)? The answer is that a goal can have mental or cognitive existence not only before its attainment in the outside world, but before the response itself. This psychological existence is called an intention.

The emergence of cybernetic concepts in the fifties made this formulation of an intention as some type of cognitive model seem like a serious possibility for the first time. The appearance of Plans and the Structure of Behavior, by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960), was an important step in the application of cybernetic concepts to the analysis of intentional behavior. For these authors, intention refers to a plan, and the basic unit of a plan is the feedback loop. Their feedback loop consists of four sequential phases: Test, Operate, Test, Exit (hence the acronym TOTE). The Test constitutes an internal model of a set of conditions discrepant from current conditions. This discrepancy sets off the Operate phase, consisting of behavior directed toward the elimination of the discrepancy. Repeated Tests assess whether the discrepancy has been eliminated. When a Test results in a match between the model and actual conditions, a stop order results and the activity terminates (Exit). Thus, the Test really consists of a model of an end state or goal that antedates behavior itself (the Operating phase). Thus,
the TOTE has an intentional structure. The fact that Totes could perfectly well be concretized as elements in a computer program brought up the possibility of a cognitive model without necessary recourse to the elusive concept of consciousness.

The reality of such a model as more than just a useful metaphor for human behavior was enhanced by Pribram, Spinelli, and Kambac's (1967) neurophysiological findings that intention—the internal representation of a goal—can be electrically recorded in the projection areas of the macaque monkey's brain, a phenomenon labeled feed-forward or corollary discharge. It was found that this mechanism, formally parallel to the initial Test in a TOTE unit, facilitates the intended behavior which follows. However, we cannot observe corollary discharge behaviorally any more easily than we can observe the test phase in a cybernetic loop, and so we are often in a position of making inferences about the intentionality of behavior from subsequent attempts at goal attainment. Can such inferences be logically justified? And what would be the behavioral bases for such inferences? Let us approach the second question first.

Making Intention Observable: Toward Operational Definition

Bruner suggests some criteria for the operational definition of intention: "Intention, viewed behaviorally, has several measurable features: anticipation of the outcome of an act, selection among appropriate means for achievement of an end state, sustained direction of behavior during deployment of means, a stop order defined by an end state, and finally some form of substitution rule whereby alternative means can be deployed for correction of deviation or to fit idiosyncratic conditions" (1974, pp. 168-169). This approach has an honorable history in American psychology going back to McDougall, who made a list of what he called "objective marks of purpose" (Boden, 1972).

However, not all these behavioral characteristics are defining attributes in the sense of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956). Searle's analysis of intentionality selects two from among this list as having definitional status: 1. directedness, roughly equivalent to Bruner's "sustained direction of behavior during deployment of means", and 2. presentation or representation of conditions of satisfaction, roughly equivalent to Bruner's "stop order defined by an end state." These criteria must now be inserted into a logical framework in order to find a home within the province of experimental psychology. This framework constitutes a positive response to the first question, above, as to whether inferences about intentionality can be logically justified. After presenting the logical framework, I shall propose ways of concretizing these criteria so that they may be observed in the stream of communicative interaction.

A Logical Analysis of Intention

The specific logical operations used to study an intention are different from those used in standard experiments, although it is important to realize that they are but different operations within one and the same, unified logical system. What follows is an attempt to formalize Searle's basic definition of intention. In this formalization, D is the directionality of behavior toward a specifiable goal G contained in the intention I. The condition T is the termination of the directed behavior upon attainment of G, the goal. Goal is a more common term corresponding to Searle's conditions of satisfaction. The logic of operationally establishing an intention goes as follows: if intention I exists, D and, under condition G, T follow; if intention I does not exist, neither does D or T, under condition G. From this, it follows that the presence of D and T under condition G implies I. This situation can be summarized as follows: (Key to symbols: \(\rightarrow\) implies; \(\Lambda\) and; \(\sim\) = not)

\[ I \rightarrow D \land (G \rightarrow T) \]

\[ \sim I \rightarrow \sim (D \land (G \rightarrow T)) \]

Intention implies Directedness and (if Goal, Termination)

\[ \therefore D \land (G \rightarrow T) \rightarrow I \]

This conclusion means that if we can establish directedness and termination in the presence of the goal, we have established a particular intention. What differs from the usual experimental situation is that the necessary and sufficient conditions of the Intention follow it in time. In the classical paradigm involving independent and dependent variables (IV and DV), the hypothesis to be proved is typically IV \(\rightarrow\) DV. Generally there is no reason to

3. Schegloff (personal communication, 1980) points out that a given goal can be described in different ways. Operationalization of intentions does not, however, depend on a unique or common description of a particular goal; rather it requires a description such that, under similar circumstances, another observer could identify the same goal in the ongoing stream of behavior.

Schegloff also points out that a given, observable goal can result from different internal intentions. The operational definition cannot select the operative intention in a given case. Therefore, insofar as an observable goal has multiple possible intentions behind it, it seems more accurate to claim that, in a particular instance, we have operationally identified not a particular, specific intention, but a class of intentions defined by the goal that has been observed.
assume or attempt to prove \( \sim \text{Iv} \rightarrow \sim \text{Dv} \) and therefore it does not follow that \( \text{Dv} \rightarrow \text{Iv} \). (Indeed, every introductory psychology student is taught that to go from \( \text{Iv} \rightarrow \text{Dv} \) to \( \text{Dv} \rightarrow \text{Iv} \) is to commit the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent.) However, in talking about the logic of an intention we are talking about interdependencies of parts in a complex intraindividual structure, in contrast to independent and dependent variables, which are by definition logically independent. In the latter case, it follows that other stimuli besides the one in question could produce a given response. However, it is not the case that directional behavior and its termination upon attainment of a goal can exist without a corresponding intention. Therefore, \( \sim \text{I} \rightarrow \sim (D \land (G \rightarrow T)) \). This relationship must be true because, without an intention, how would a direction be set or a goal be recognized as such? That is to say, there is a structural interdependence among the various parts of an intention that does not exist between an independent and dependent variable in the classical paradigm of experimental psychology. Pursuing the analogy with the TOTÉ units of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960), we can say that a feedback or cybernetic loop cannot exist without setting conditions for the initial test. This structural interdependence produces the mutual implication that does not exist in an Iv \( \rightarrow \text{Dv} \) paradigm. It is this situation of mutual implication that makes it logical to identify a particular intention by events which follow it in time.

Note, too, how much more complex the logic of an intention is in comparison with the logic of a standard experiment. Unlike the later, the logic of intention contains an embedded conditional component \( (G \rightarrow T) \), that is, \( (\text{if } G, \text{ then } T) \). This conditional component produces an indeterminacy in interpreting certain behavioral phenomena. That is, if Termination occurs in the absence of Goal attainment, there might or might not be an intention. This formal consequence mirrors the situation in life: an extensive effort to realize a goal may be abandoned before it is attained if the effort is too difficult. Or the absence of goal attainment may mean that an intention was not present in the first place.

In conclusion, the logical complexity and partial indeterminacy of intentionality may well have been barriers to its acceptance in experimental psychology, especially in the absence of an explicit formal analysis to aid in the interpretation of concrete phenomena.

**Analysis of Intention within an Interactional Framework**

The key to an interactional approach to intention is the negotiated interpretation of intention. Considering the period in which children are making the transition to language, researchers have often raised the question as to how we know the mother’s interpretation corresponds to the child’s actual intention, something actually going on within the child (Howe, 1977; Rodgon, 1977; Ryan, 1974). People do not generally ask how we know whether the child’s interpretation of the mother’s intention is correct at this stage. One reason is that the question has not been looked at interactively from the child’s point of view. That is, no one worries about what the child’s interpretation of the situation is. One only wants an “objective” description of behavior and the child’s interpretation (if it could be known) is considered superfluous to this end. This is so because language is given privileged status as behavior and the mother’s intentions, occurring in linguistic form, are taken at face value as “objective” facts. In contrast, the child’s interpretations, occurring on the level of action and visual behavior (that is, the sensorimotor level) are not valued and generally not even noticed.

The processes of mutual interpretation that go on in communicative interaction, as manifest through microanalytic techniques, can, however, reveal observable signs of the two major features of intentionality: directionality and terminal requirements (Bruner, 1974) and go beyond the solipsism of each participant’s interpretation of the other participant’s intention. This interactional approach draws heavily on conversational analysis in sociology as developed by Schegloff and Sacks (1973), but does not necessarily stay within its bounds.

My example will draw from the analysis my students and I have made of the comprehension of offers, both both verbal and nonverbal, by young children just starting to talk (Reilly, Zukow, and Greenfield, 1978; Zukow, Reilly, and Greenfield, 1979). From viewing and reviewing videotapes of naturally occurring communication in the home, the following interactional model of the general structure of an offer sequence was developed:

**I. Offer establishment**

- a. Offer presentation: Within an ongoing interaction the caregiver establishes the topic of the offer as well as the fact that an offer is in progress, that is, the communicative force (offer) and propositional content (object or activity) are presented.

- b. Offer acknowledgment: The child’s behavior not only is appropriate as a response to the offer presentation (Ia) but also establishes the offer presentation interactionally, i.e., shows that it was taken to be an offer. Further, the acknowledgment elicits either realization or nullification (IIa).

**II. Offer consummation**

- a. Offer realization or nullification: The caregiver displays that she has assessed that the child’s prior behavior constitutes an offer acknowledgment (Ib). This display facilitates the enactment (IIb) of the offer in the case of positive acknowledgment (Ib) or terminates the offer in the case of a negative acknowledgment (Ib).
b. Offer enactment: In the case of positive acknowledgment (Ib), followed by an offer realization (IIa), the child consumes the offer by taking the object, performing the activity, or refusing to do so.

The breaking down of the offer into these minute components allows intentionality to become observable and therefore operationally identifiable. That is, we may now observe directionality of behavior and termination of directional behavior in the presence of the goal. Here is an example from our data laid out in this interactional framework:

I. Offer establishment
   a. Offer presentation: "Do you want a cookie, Jim?"
   b. Offer acknowledgment: Jim begins to reach for the cookie.

II. Offer consumption
   a. Offer realization: Mother finishes bringing cookie to child.
   b. Offer enactment: Child grabs cookie.

The first part of the offer establishment, Ia, "Do you want a cookie, Jim?" is hypothesized to represent the intentional offer of a cookie on the part of the mother. As a speech act, the offer implies a communicative intention to be acknowledged as an offer. This implies a particular intention: the commitment to give the object of the offer to the other person if the other person shows evidence of positive feeling toward it. (This definition of the offer as a particular sort of intentional structure is based on Searle's [1975] analysis of commissives.) To confirm our hypothesis concerning the existence of these intentions, we must establish conditions D and (G→T). With respect to this intention, evidence for D (directionality) in the mother’s behavior is provided at IIa where mother finishes her movement of bringing the cookie to the child, following the child’s demonstration at Ib of positive feeling toward the offer by beginning to reach for the cookie. Two ordered points are needed to establish a direction. Item IIa establishes directionality because it follows Ia and therefore constitutes the second point. Evidence of termination (T) of directional behavior in the presence of G is also implied by IIb: For the child to grasp the cookie, the mother must stop doing or terminate what she was doing at Ia, holding onto the cookie while passing it to the child; that is, mother lets go of the cookie.

Directionality in fulfilling the communicative intention to have the offer acknowledged can be demonstrated only where there is not immediate acknowledgment, where, unlike the offer under discussion, Ib did not, in fact, follow directly after Ia. We must look at offers where immediate acknowledgment does not occur in order to find at least two behavioral points going in the direction of obtaining acknowledgment. In this offer, for example, after the initial offer presentation at Ia, the mother gets an actual cookie (absent until now) and re-offers, on the sensorimotor level rather than linguistically, extending the cookie to Jim. Re-offers such as this one establish directionality of behavior vis-à-vis the intention to have the offer acknowledged. Once acknowledgment occurs, the phase of offer presentation ends, its termination condition fulfilled. Thus, it is just where the intended consequences do not immediately occur that the intentional structure becomes most visible. One of Bruner’s criteria of intention is apparent in this example: the re-offer of the sensorimotor level manifests the mother’s ability to substitute alternative means where necessary.

On the child’s side, we can also find evidence of directional behavior and its termination in the presence of the goal. In the case of the child, our hypothesis is that he has the intention to accept his mother’s offer. His behavior of starting to reach to the cookie at Ib establishes the first point in a particular direction. Grasping the cookie at IIb constitutes a second point in the direction, as well as the termination of the activity of getting the cookie.

The interactively negotiated nature of intention is demonstrated in this example. The child’s acknowledgment at Ib (beginning to reach) constitutes an interpretation of the caregiver’s intention to offer. Schegloff and Sacks generalize about the usefulness of pairs such as Ia and Ib: What two utterances produced by different speakers can do is: by an adjacent position second, a speaker can show that he understood what a prior aimed at, and that he is willing to go along with that. Also, by virtue of the occurrence of an adjacent produced second, the doer of a first can see that what he intimated was indeed understood, and that it was or was not accepted (1973, pp. 297–298). This described the situation perfectly, except that we include nonverbal components as possible members of a pair. Schegloff and Sacks restrict their analysis to the linguistic parts of communicative interaction, but there is no theoretical barrier to extending it to the nonverbal components of dialogue. Note, in fact, that the analysis applies as well to the child who reaches toward what has been offered as to the child who says, "Yes."

The caregiver’s enactment of the offer at IIa (bringing cookie to child) constitutes an acceptance of the child’s previous interpretation of the interaction as an offer by establishing the directionality of her own behavior. This move also constitutes an interpretation of the child’s intention to receive. The next move of the child, taking the cookie at IIb, manifests his own directionality and thus constitutes an acceptance of the caregiver’s interpretation of his intention. In this way person B’s collaboration with person A’s intended plan provides behavioral evidence for person B’s perception of person A’s intention. Consequently an interactive analysis not only throws each participant’s own intentions into relief, it also illuminates how each perceives the intentions of the other.

At both IIa and IIb, the acceptance of the other participant’s interpretation of one’s own intention does not necessarily mean that the interpretation
was accurate and that we know the first person's original intention. It does not mean that this interpretation is currently acceptable as a basis for further action. Hence the interaction displays a mutually negotiated interpretation of the intention of each participant. Because each interpretation may influence the other's next move, there is really no way of knowing the original intention of either participant. However, the agreed upon interpretation of each person's intention in the dyad is an important phenomenon in its own right. Note, too, that complementary intentions are necessary between the parties for either party's intention to be carried out. For instance, the child's intention to accept an object cannot be carried out without the mother's intention to give it to him.

**Intent and Consciousness: Searle's Distinction between Prior Intention and Intention in Action**

... intent in communication is difficult to deal with for a variety of reasons, not least demanding of which is the morass into which it leads when one tries to establish whether something was really, or consciously intended. Does a prelinguistic infant consciously intend to signal his displeasure or express his delight? (Bruner, 1974–1975, p. 262).

Searle has most recently made a distinction which seems to obviate the need to decide on consciousness. This is the distinction between intention-in-action and prior intent. The latter involves representation of conditions of satisfaction, whereas the former involves mere presentation. That is, in prior intention there is some mental model of the conditions of satisfaction before the action begins. In intention-in-action the conditions of satisfaction are implicitly present during the intentional action. There need not be an explicit representation, such as a visual image or a linguistic formulation. Prior intentions include intentions in action, but not vice versa. For example, "I intended to raise my arm," followed by the act of doing so constitutes a prior intention followed by an intention-in-action; this intention-in-action is actually a component of the prior intention. If I raise my arm without saying anything in advance, it then becomes simply an intention-in-action, Searle goes on to answer Wittgenstein's (1953) question: If I raise my arm, what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm went up? His answer: intentionality, and, more specifically, intention-in-action.

4. The possibility of shifting goals causes difficulties for the formalized operationalization put forth earlier in the chapter, as Schegloff (personal communication, 1980) pointed out to me. In such a sequence, only the last goal is consummated. It has been pointed out earlier in the chapter that, in any case, the interpretation of an intention is logically indeterminate whenever a goal is not consummated. It follows that the operational analysis being proposed would successfully identify the last in a sequence of shifting intentions, but could not identify the original intention nor any earlier intention in the sequence.

5. Searle, op. cit.


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... distinction between prior intention and intention-in-action allows us to clarify the sensorimotor infant and the representational linguistically competent adult: the former is capable of intention-in-action, but not prior intention, whereas the latter is capable of both. At the same time the distinction makes clear the commonality in intentional structures at different developmental levels: from infancy through adulthood human beings manifest behavior directed toward the fulfillment of specific conditions of satisfaction. Unlike the notion of conscious intention, that of prior intention is susceptible to operationalization, through the indices of overt representation and the timing of such representation before action takes place. This is not to say that prior intention cannot be internally represented, but only that the potential for external representation renders it observable upon at least certain occasions. Yet Searle's notion of prior intention seems to capture much of what we understand, in everyday usage, by conscious intention.

Our study of adult-initiated offers provides many interesting examples of sensitive interfacing between a prior communicative intention expressed linguistically (representation) by an adult and intention-in-action manifested enactively (presentation) by a young child. Take, for example, the offer transcribed in table 1. The mother initially offers her offer overtly by means of the linguistic form. "(Do ya) wanna comb the baby's hair?" This sentence linguistically represents both intentional components of a speech act identified by Searle (1979): the illocutionary force—here, the intention to offer, marked by "(Do ya) wanna"—and the propositional content or intentional object—here, combing the baby's hair. The mother proceeds to carry out an intention-in-action by holding out the doll (2.24.00), presenting the comb (2.24.66), and showing Alice how to comb hair (2.26.12). This intention-in-action is thus part of and subordinated to the linguistically expressed prior intention ["(Do ya) wanna comb the baby's hair?"] Alice, for her part, acknowledges the offer (1b) in action by taking the doll (2.29.93). Her mother's act of giving her the comb (IIa 1a' at 2.30.51) indicates her interpretation of taking the doll as signifying Alice's intention to comb the doll's hair. Alice confirms this interpretation by taking further steps in the same direction at Ib' (2.30.70) and IIb' (2.31.20), where she reaches toward and grasps the comb. Finally, at IIb she combs the doll's hair (2.31.90). The point here is that the mother expresses a prior intention which, because it is a communicative intention, involves a complementary intention on the part of the listener in order to be realized. Alice...
<table>
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<tr>
<th>min</th>
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<th>Toybox</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>seated, holding doll</td>
<td>&lt; A</td>
<td>∨</td>
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<td>58</td>
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<td>reaches into box</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>counter-clockwise turn, comb the baby's hair?/</td>
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<td>stands up, holding hat</td>
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<td>clockwise turn</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>arm in box, pulls out comb</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>smiling, combs doll's hair</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>reaches up, combs A's hair</td>
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The end of an utterance is represented by an oblique (/). The length of an utterance is depicted by a column of vertical obliques to the right of the time code. Contextual notes are enclosed in double parentheses; uncertain transcriptions in single parentheses. Underlining indicates increased loudness. Overlap is indicated by brackets ([ ]). Colons (:) indicate syllable lengthening. A lexical item that is cut-off before completion is indicated by an upper-case dash, e.g., *wha*'. When the termination of one utterance or word is nearly simultaneous with the beginning of the next utterance or word, this rapid offset/onset or latching is indicated as follows, Ia! /= Out/. Pauses are specified in seconds and tenths of seconds, e.g., (1.7), while pauses of undetermined length are indicated as follows, ( ). Brackets indicate duration of mothers' stances. The direction of eye gaze is represented vis-a-vis the TV monitor screen horizontally as follows: >, facing right; <, facing left; Ð, facing away from the camera; ∨, facing toward the camera. Eye gaze direction on a vertical axis is represented in this way: t, up; l, down. Body orientation, in the upper left hand corner of the transcript, is schematized as follows: C, body facing to the right; D, body facing to the left, and so on. The offer constituents Ia, Ib, etc., are also entered to the right of the transcript.
responds with a complementary intention but it is an intention-in-action, there being no indication in her overt behavior of any symbolic representation of a prior intention. Searle's distinction brings into clear relief the intentional quality of each participant's role, while highlighting developmental differences in form.

Displaying Directionality and Conditions of Satisfaction through Selective Repetition

Is the negotiated process of interpretation occurring in interaction a meaningful index of intention? Or is acceptance of the other participant's interpretation of one's own intention so automatic that it provides no information at all? This question is particularly important in studying early language acquisition where the child's linguistic means to overtly reject an interpretation are limited or nonexistent. But our basic criteria of intentionality reveal instances in which the child rejects the mother's interpretation of the intended content of communication. Here is an example from Early Words (Greenfield, Bruner, and May, 1972), a film made to illustrate phenomena in the late one-word period. The child in the film is Matthew (my son) at twenty-two months of age:

Matthew is stringing Playskool wooden beads. The beads are different shapes, but the same basic size. He says "Big" as he threads one on the tip of the string. I ask "Is that a big bead?" and he repeats "Big," adding a second bead to the tip. I say "What's big? Oh, you want to put two beads on, is that big?" and he responds, "Yeah."

Here we see what Bruner calls "sustained direction of behavior" in the form of repetition. Termination of the communication does not occur until a specific interpretation occurs: that two beads make his construction big. This example is interesting because Matthew seems to be making a very subtle discrimination between two possible meanings of the word "big." The initial misinterpretation as big bead elicits a repetition of "big"; the repetition in turn becomes evidence of sustained directionality. Thus, this example also illustrates the point made earlier that intentional structure is most visible where the intended consequences do not immediately occur.

Another point about the example is the presence of explicit confirmation of the "conditions of satisfaction" by the word "yeah," a topic to which I shall return later.

The question can arise, as always, as to whether Matthew changes his intended message in midstream. Although always possible, as mentioned earlier, it seems unlikely with this particular example because the interpretation finally accepted by Matthew also agrees more closely with the state of affairs in the referential situation than the earlier one which he rejected. That is, the beads were all basically the same size, but he did in fact make a two-bead tower. Indeed, big turned out to mark a prior intention on Matthew's part. After saying the word, he proceeded to add the second bead.

The logic of prior intention means that its identification depends on knowing what happens after the intention is expressed. This runs counter to the behavioral and experimental tradition in psychology, according to which it is customary to understand behavior in terms of what has preceded, rather than followed it. It is important to make this difference clear. Otherwise adherence to the old paradigm will constitute an unacknowledged barrier to the systematic study of intention in psychology.

The preceding example also shows that conversation with the child about how to interpret what he has said can make a very specific semantic intention visible. It becomes clear that the potential for extremely subtle semantic intentions are present even in the one-word period of language development. An important methodological point is that we are talking not just about repetition but about repetition in a conversational context. The candidate interpretation which Matthew does not accept, made by the other participant, gives important evidence as the exact nature of his intention.

This use of repetition shows developmental continuity. Keenan (1975) has documented the same use of repetition to gain acknowledgment of specific word combinations in slightly older children. Adults use repetition with young children in exactly the same way. Indeed, in our study of adult-initiated offer sequences, there were many instances in which repetition provided evidence of an adult's communicative intention vis-à-vis the child. As with the child, what was surprising was that adult caregivers set about actualizing rather specific intents, especially considering the immaturity of their interlocutors. Consider the example shown in table 2.

Note that the child emits a number of behaviors including looking at his mother, but the mother continues to repeat the offer (for example "Wanna do it?" at 312.31 seconds). In the language of conversational analysis, this transcript allows us to look at candidate acknowledgments, ones which the mother does not interpret as such (Schegloff, personal communication, 1979). The child never does do anything specifically relevant to patty-cake and the mother never goes beyond offer presentation by proceeding to the next step of an offer realization. Finally the child crawls away. This example establishes the directionality of the mother's behavior by the repetition
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>min</th>
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<th>frac</th>
<th>non-verbal</th>
<th>verbal</th>
<th>eye gaze</th>
<th>eye gaze</th>
<th>verbal</th>
<th>non-verbal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>seated on floor</td>
<td></td>
<td>▽ ↓ J</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>03</td>
<td></td>
<td>leans toward Jeremy</td>
<td>Je:remy</td>
<td>&gt; ↓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>leans closer and closer to Jeremy</td>
<td>You wanna play patty-cake with Mommy?/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>sits up</td>
<td>Wan play pa: ((high pitched)) ti-cake?/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>toy in mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>clockwise turn, leans right: ⊂ J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Lillian</td>
<td>drops toy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; ↓ toy</td>
<td>sits up, toy in hand: ⊂ J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>puts toy into mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 31  | 10  |      | Wanna do it?/ |        | △ ↑ Liz  |        |        |            |
| 2   | 31  |      | Do you wanna play with Mommy?/ |        | ↓ toys ring |        |        |            |
| 3   | 00  |      |        |        |          |        |        | begins to drop toy |
| 03  | 46  |      |        |        |          |        |        | toy drops into ring picks up toy |
| 4   | 18  | 71   | claps hands on Mommy |        |          |        |        | toy into mouth turns right: ⊂ J |
| 5   | 33  | 43   | Je:remy! |        |          |        |        |            |
| 6   | 53  | 81   | ((singing)) | Patty: claps ((see arrows)) | ↓ Cake |          |        | crawls away→ |
| 7   | 18  | 71   |        |        |          |        |        |            |
| 8   | 20  | 86   | claps |        | ↓ patty |          |        |            |
| 9   |     |      | sits up |        | ↓ cake/ |          |        |            |
| 91  |     |      | hands to lap |        |          |          |        |            |
| 93  |     |      |        |        |          |          |        |            |
of her offer. But the assessment of conditions of satisfaction is indetermi-
inate. Repetition of the offer stopped when the child crawled away, but
surely one would not want to claim that conditions of satisfaction were met.
Logically, the existence of a specific intention is indeterminate: the goal or
object of intention is known, having been explicitly represented in the form
of a prior intention ("You wanna play patty-cake with Mommy?") and yet
termination occurs in the absence of the goal. G → T does not apply because
the goal has not been achieved. That is, it is not false as G → T does not
imply T → G, but rather implies the possibility that conditions other than G
produce T. Because G → T is a necessary condition to infer the presence of
an intention, this situation (~ G ∧ T) leaves the presence of an intention
up-in-the-air, logically indeterminate. This corresponds to my sense of a
phenomenon in person perception: if a person expresses an intention and
you observe that person carrying out directed behavior relevant to the goal,
but the person never attains the goal, you are left wondering whether the
expressed intention was a sincere and genuine one.

Empirically, the interactive interpretation of intention can be useful in
providing more information in the absence of the successful achievement of
an intention. In the example under discussion, absence of an offer realiza-
tion or nullification by the mother indicates that she did not interpret the
child as having had the intention to acknowledge this specific offer. Still,
logically definitive evidence concerning the mother’s intention is lacking. It
could be argued that where prior intent has been overtly represented, goal
attainment is not a necessary condition to infer the presence of an intention,
that in such cases the representation of the intention plus the directed
behavior are sufficient. This seems possible if one does not worry about
hypocrisy, that is, if the representation of an intention is taken at face value.
The stiffer criterion, including G → T, in contrast, eliminates from the class
of intentions cases where people verbally express an intention but do not
carry it through.

The mother’s repetitions of the offer in this example also illustrate a
characteristic of intentional linguistic communication that is rare in the very
young children with whom the caregivers were interacting: that is, what
Bruner (1974) calls substitution of alternative means to correct for devia-
tion. Thus, in table 1 each repetition of verbal offer involves a slight varia-
tion on the original theme, ‘You wanna play patty-cake with Mommy?’
Alternative means are even broader than these verbal repetitions: this
mother, for example, uses the child’s name as an attention-getting device
and demonstrates the activity being offered (the intentional object in
Searle’s terminology) by clapping her hands. Indeed, our results showed
that unless the mother’s alternative means were relevant to getting the
child’s visual attention on the offer or to presenting it nonverbally, that is,
on a sensorimotor level, linguistic repetition and variation did not succeed
in actualizing the mother’s intention to communicate an offer by eliciting an
acknowledgment any more than did the original presentation.

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When we are talking about intention-in-action, rather than prior inten-
tion, is there not a certain degree of circularity in our operationalization?
The problem is this: conditions of satisfaction G are part of and identi-

died by the intention in question. Yet without evidence of a prior intention,
there seems to be no way of identifying the goal, independent of its termina-
tion of behavior. In such cases, one way of breaking this circularity is
through behavioral confirmation of the goal attainment in subsequent inter-
action: for instance, Matthew’s “yeah” in the example just presented. It
need not, however, be linguistic confirmation. My informal observations
suggest that, under appropriate circumstances, relaxation and smiling might,
for example, serve as behavioral indices that an intention has been realized.

Children Begin to Use Linguistic Means to Accept or Reject
Adult Interpretations of their Communicative Intent

The next example of communicative intentions illustrates the use of “no”
and “yeah” to explicitly confirm or disconfirm the mother’s interpretation
of the child’s communicative intent. The example (from Matthew, age nine-
teen months twenty-one days) also reveals once again how communicative
intentions become more visible when they are not immediately realized.
This example also shows how an adult repeats the child’s utterance as a
communication check, while the child repeats his until it is basically under-
stood; these two phenomena were noted by Keenan (1975).

[Matthew’s sister Lauren had gone out of the room.]

MOTHER: Lara [Lauren].
MATTHEW: Yeah, Lauren. What happened to Lauren?
MATTHEW: Oh [or ou, two transcribers disagreed].
MOTHER: Oh?
MATTHEW: No.
MOTHER: Hoe?
MATTHEW: Ou.
MOTHER: Out?10
MATTHEW: Yeah. Yaya [Lauren].

Keenan (1975) reports examples of yeah used to confirm an adult inter-
pretation at two years nine days. Our data indicate that the earliest use of no
and yeah in response to adult communication checks occur for Matthew
during the observation session at seventeen months thirteen days, much ear-
er than one might think. Nonetheless, repetition and its termination
appears at the very onset of language as signs of intentionality in children’s
speech.

10. Schegloff (personal communication, 1980) points out the importance of a
list of candidate goals in the mother’s mind to the process of inferring the child’s
intention in this type of sequence.
In addition, the foregoing example makes it clear that the child's intent encompasses more than getting the attention of his mother; he also wants to get a specific message across. Indeed, his addition of *Yaya* at the end of the discourse appears to indicate an awareness that the original topic, Lauren, may have been lost in the discussion that subsequently ensured concerning his comment.

Although both mother and child, therefore, give strong indications that communication is in the attempt to share intention, their roles in the management of the process are somewhat different. In these cases, the mother is the one who takes responsibility for the achievement. If the mother expresses an intention through an utterance or action A, and if acknowledgment of that intention fails to occur, she tries to communicate that intention to the child via alternative expressions or actions A', A'', and so on. On the other hand, if the child expresses intention via A and similar acknowledgment fails to occur, he just repeats A and the adult varies the interpretation until she hits an expression which the child takes to be appropriate to that intention. Thus with young children the adult carries the major role in managing the sharing of intentions, a point nicely shown in the papers of Kaye and Charney, and of Brown in this volume.

**Expectation or Intention?**

At this point the reader may ask, is it really necessary to use such a sloppy term as "intention"? What about "expectation"?—it has future reference, as well as an honorable history in psychology. This is my reply: Speakers do not merely expect certain results in their hearers; they actively work to cause them, and this becomes overt when the effect is question is not immediately produced. Searle, in his recent analysis of intentionality (1979), sees the causal component as crucial in setting intention apart from other mental states, among which expectation would presumably be included. According to Searle, an intention is satisfied when it causes its intentional object. For example, the intention to kill someone (the intentional object) is satisfied when you poison him; the expectation that he will die may also be fulfilled at the same time. However, the intention to kill someone is not fulfilled when the person dies in his sleep from a heart attack. Thus, intention may often include expectation, but expectation does not have all the qualities of intention. Keenan, a pioneer in the application of conversational analysis to the conversations of very young children, adopts the notion of speaker expectation as central. I would like to argue that she is really talking about intention. Consider, for example, the following instance of dialogue between a pair of twins, age two years, nine months (Keenan, 1974) in which a comment is repeated until what she terms the expected acknowledgment occurs:

**Analysis of Intentionality**

Twin A: ee moth moth/
Twin B: goosey goosey gander/ where shall I wander/
Twin A: ee moth moth moth moth/
Twin B: up downstairs lady's chamber/
Twin A: ee moth moth moth/
Twin B: ee le moth/

Expectation seems inadequate to explain what the speaker trying to get moth across does. His repetition constitutes an active attempt to have his message acknowledged. Expectation would seem more appropriate if he merely waited for an acknowledgment after the first try. (It is only fair to say that Keenan gives communicative intent a central role in general, although it does not come into her analysis of specific data. The foregoing comments are addressed less to Keenan than to those who attempt to exclude intention completely from the vocabulary of scientific inquiry into human behavior.) Psychology used to consider the person as an exclusively passive respondent to environmental stimuli; the last twenty years have witnessed a profound change in this conception. A preference for "expectation" rather than "intention" under all circumstances reflects this old view of the person as passive and needs to be rejected with it.

**Repairs as Evidence for Intentional Structure**

A repair as defined in conversational analysis serves to clarify mishearings and misunderstandings, or more generally, fix any trouble source in conversation (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks, 1977). Reilly has studied children’s repairs, both spontaneous (self-initiated) and those initiated by an interlocutor (for example by "huh?"). While Kiéyermann has studied the latter. Both investigators have noticed that the second time around, the utterance becomes more refined or expanded. Jefferson (1979) has noticed this same phenomenon in adults. Here is an example of a self-initiated repair from Reilly (1978):

**NOAH [3,0; playing with a train]: De udder way**

**See it goes the udder way**

From the point of view of intention, the first utterance apparently does not meet the terminal requirements or conditions of satisfaction set by the child. Hence, the second utterance which establishes the component of directionality: movement toward greater elaboration. Reilly concludes, "Since it is the child, in these cases, who initiated the expansion, we can infer at most that he has some intention of producing the more complex or refined struc-

nature, but that he needs two turns to accomplish this level of complexity. Or we can assume at least that he is unsatisfied with the first turn, and produces the second to refine his initial utterance" (p. 4). In this case, there is no evidence to infer that the intention is motivated by an intention to communicate, since the response of a hearer is not involved. A communicative intent may still be involved as the child may intend the more complex message in itself, not merely as a clarification of a first, inadequate one. This Reilly’s view; she sees the division of the message into two turns as a strategy for simplifying constructions on the leading edge of the child’s linguistic competence.

Other-initiated repairs have a clearer communicative intention and thus functionally resemble repetition when the first message doesn’t get across. The more elaborate nature of the second turn noted both by Reilly for American children (1978) and Käyserman (1979) for Swiss children gives initiated repairs a special form of directionality going beyond the mere persistence of self-repetition. Indeed, they manifest one of the optional characteristics of intentional behavior present on Bruner’s list: a substitution rule whereby alternative means can be deployed for correction of direction. Here is an example of the phenomenon from Reilly:

JAMIE [6,3]: How an hour is long sometimes and so short another time?
MOTHER: What, honey?
JAMIE: How can an hour be long sometimes and so short another time?

Mother signals unsuccessful communication and Jamie constructs an alternative sentence to correct the situation.

Considering other-initiated repair as an intentional structure, one would like to know what happened after Jamie’s second turn. Did his mother say something to show that she had understood the second version? The answer to this question is relevant to understanding Jamie’s intentional object, the nature of the conditions of satisfaction for his intention. It was not, however, necessary for Reilly’s purpose of examining repair as a learning strategy. This example thus illustrates how the study of intentional structures demands more information on the consequences of behavior than we, as behavioral scientists, are in the habit of collecting.

Disentangling the Intention to Communicate from a Communicative Intention

The intention to communicate is basically the intention to affect a particular audience. A communicative intention is the particular effect (illocu-

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The child goes toward his mother, whining “shoes, shoes” (he has only socks on). He comes back toward me and gets his blue sandals. I try to help him while standing up, but cannot do it. So I sit down with one shoe, put him on my lap, and put his shoe on. Then I put him down, not saying anything. He walks straight to his other shoe, picks it up, and comes back to me. I put him on my lap and put his other shoe on. He then runs toward his mother still talking, saying “shoe, shoe” in an excited voice. He lifts his foot to show her. When she attends, he points to me. She understands, saying something like “The lady put your shoes on.” Both are very excited.

The intention to communicate with his mother is distinct from his message, the intentional communication, because mother and shoes are in opposite spatial directions. Note his literal directionality (in space) and note he stops repeating ‘shoes’ after reaching his mother. His intentional communication, in contrast, is a desire to have his shoes on. This is demonstrated by the fact that he ultimately goes toward the shoes and engages in complex interaction with me in order to get them on. He is a very active participant in this process: note where he goes to the second shoe, picks it up, and brings it back to me. This complex sequence of steps would seem another way in which directionality (D) can be operationally characterized. Once his shoes are on (G), action on my lap is terminated (G→T). Now, however, he communicates ‘shoe, shoe’ in an excited voice. This change from whining to excitement is an interesting candidate for an observable index of goal attainment, the fulfillment of intention. While possibly marking the attainment of one goal, it also constitutes the beginning of a second communication. Again, the intention to communicate to mother is manifest in running toward her (D) and stopping when he reaches her (G→T). The communicative intention is then revealed. He lifts his foot until his mother attends. The continuation of this position exactly until drawing his moth-

13. Cazden (1977) restricts communicative intent to illocutionary force, whereas Dore (1975) points out that “intention” has been used in the field of child language to refer to both locutionary and illocutionary aspects, in accord with my usage here. These terminological differences do not, however, affect the points under discussion.
er's attention is our only evidence of directionality; timing certainly should be useful evidence in cases where we have a video record, but we do not have one here. The termination of footlifting (only implicit in my notes) fulfills the G→T condition. This lacuna in my notes illustrates the kind of information often missing in observations because it is taken for granted. I think there is a general tendency to note onset of new behavior and take terminations for granted. The child then points to me, and his mother interprets his message. At this point, knowledge of the child's response would be needed to know if he accepts his mother's interpretation of his semantic intention. Again, my notes, taken for a different purpose, make the common error of not extending enough into the consequences of action to satisfy the complete requirements of a stringent analysis of intention. Nevertheless, this example does illustrate certain circumstances in which a group of related intentions can be disentangled through analyzing complex sequential interaction.

**Conclusion**

Speech act theory as developed by Scarle (1969; 1975a; 1975b; 1979) makes intention intrinsic to language use. However, by leaving out the sequential course of communicative interaction, it provides little means for the operational definition required for stringent application to empirical phenomena. Conversational analysis as developed by Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (for example, Schegloff and Sacks, 1973; Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977) provides the latter, but generally prefers to talk about the functions of sentences rather than the intentions of people. I have tried to integrate these two sets of contributions in the belief that their integration will allow the issue of intentionality to be systematically and empirically investigated. Yet it is necessary to go beyond the linguistic phenomena addressed by speech act theory and conversational analysis. I hope this chapter has made it clear that our analysis is not limited to intention in linguistic interaction, but applies to nonverbal (sensorimotor) interaction, as well as interaction which uses both modes together (cf. the two transcripts of offers, tables 1 and 2). Indeed, the logic of intention and its operationalization applies to intentional action as well as interaction. Because an intention is essentially an internal cognitive state, it is only indirectly observable. One goal of this chapter was to show how, because of the mutual processes of interpretation going on in interaction, such interaction provides a context in which the intentionality of a single individual's action becomes all the more observable.

Intentionality has been with us since the beginning of psychology. Generally it has entered through the back door. My claim is that our most

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mechanistic, reductionistic pieces of research would not be possible for us as human beings if we did not impose an intentional structure on behavior. If you don't believe this try to make sense of the molecular transcripts in tables 1 and 2 without the labels identifying their organization in terms of the intentional structure of an offer (In, Ib, and so on). We need to understand much more about our own perception of intention and the basis for the perception in the actual organization of behavior. This task requires a rigorous analysis of intentionality and consideration of complex sequences of activity. The operationalization of intention requires us to study more than the stimulus antecedents of behavior; equal attention must be paid to the forward thrust of action and its interactive consequences.

**Afterword**

The intellectual history of this chapter—an important piece of my own intellectual history—constitutes a true acknowledgment of the contribution Jerome Bruner has made to my development.

The history of this chapter starts in 1961 when, in my junior year at Radcliffe College, I took Jerry's graduate seminar. We read three books, each of which provided themes for my later thinking and research: Inhelder and Piaget's *Growth of Logical Thinking*, Vygotsky's *Thought and Language*, and, most important for the present chapter, *Plans and the Structure of Behavior* by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram. This last mentioned book was the first clue I had that purpose and intention, so important to my personal view of human nature, could be rigorously treated in scientific psychology.

The topic of intention came up next when I returned to the Center for Cognitive Studies as a Fellow in 1968. Jerry was working on infancy and was full of observations and ideas about early intentionality. This was the ambiance which inspired a paper called "Goal as Environmental Variable in the Development of Intelligence" (1972). The paper was originally presented at the Conference on Contributions to Intelligence organized in the wake of the furor over Jensen's (1968) article on intelligence in the *Harvard Educational Review* and held at the University of Illinois in November 1969.

The most recent impetus for this chapter came when I was invited to join a language group organized by Jerry at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Wassenaar; I spent two weeks there in February, 1979. Although intentionality was not directly discussed, reactions of the group to our research on adult-initiated offers stimulated or provided a number of the ideas in this chapter. I am grateful to Jerry Bruner, Melissa Bowerman, David Olson, and Manny Schegloff for their serious and valuable discussion.
of our work. In addition to the NIAS group, the comments of Elena Lieven, who attended my NIAS seminar, were most useful and insightful.

With respect to this chapter, I owe a special debt to Emmanuel Schegloff whose comments on our film Early Words gave me my first glimpse into conversational analysis and how it could be applied to my own data. Although Manny and I are both at UCLA, it was through the experience at Wassenaar that we came to understand each other's work deeply enough to talk about it at a meaningful level. I am grateful to Jerry for masterminding the NIAS group and including me in it.

This chapter owes an intellectual debt to two other people in Los Angeles: to my student, Patricia Zukow through whom I gradually came to understand conversational analysis and, specifically, the methodological value of an interactive approach to the language acquisition process; and to my colleague Elfinor Keenan whose work on child discourse furnished a brilliant background against which to develop my ideas on intentionality.

The final inspiration was the passage from Jerry's autobiography with which I opened. I hope this chapter contributes to filling the need identified therein: the need to give intentionality its rightful place in our scientific description of human nature.

References


